Keypoints:
- Analysts say a successful coup in Benin would have benefited Sahel juntas
- No proof links AES governments directly to the failed putsch
- Regional intervention underscored ECOWAS and Nigeria’s resolve
THE swift collapse of an attempted coup in Benin has refocused attention on the ambitions of West Africa’s Sahelian military rulers, with analysts saying a successful takeover would have handed the region’s anti-Western juntas a rare strategic prize, even as concrete evidence of their involvement remains elusive.
The failed putsch on December 7 briefly raised fears that Benin could join the growing list of countries governed by military regimes across the Sahel. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all landlocked and ruled by juntas, have been under military control since a wave of coups between 2020 and 2023. The three countries formalised their alliance in 2023 as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), after severing ties with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and distancing themselves from France.
For analysts, the attraction of Benin is straightforward. Its Atlantic coastline and modern port infrastructure offer access that the AES countries badly lack, particularly as sanctions, border closures and diplomatic isolation have squeezed their economies.
‘It is clear that the attempt to destabilise the regime in Cotonou was pushing Benin directly into the ranks of the AES,’ a West African diplomatic source told AFP.
Early misinformation and online mobilisation
As rebel soldiers briefly appeared on national television in Cotonou to announce the overthrow of President Patrice Talon, social media accounts sympathetic to the Sahelian juntas moved quickly to frame the moment as historic. Analysts observed an early flood of misleading or false information portraying the coup as successful, despite it being rapidly put down.
Among the most vocal figures was Beninese pan-Africanist activist Kemi Seba, who declared a ‘liberation day’ to his 1.5 million followers. Seba, a fierce critic of President Talon and France, has served as an adviser to Niger’s military ruler, General Abdourahamane Tiani, since 2024 and was granted a diplomatic passport by Niamey.
‘This haste speaks volumes: either the man knew, or he received instructions to amplify things well before the outcome,’ wrote Fiacre Vidjingninou, a specialist in political and military sociology, in the French-language journal Conflits.
Benin has since issued an international arrest warrant for Seba, whose real name is Stellio Gilles Robert Capo Chichi, accusing him of ‘advocacy of crimes against state security and incitement to rebellion’. Seba has dismissed the allegations and said he intends to ‘see the fight through to the end’.
Fugitive officers and regional shelter
Questions have also emerged over the fate of Lieutenant-Colonel Pascal Tigri, identified by authorities as the alleged leader of the coup attempt. Tigri remains on the run, with persistent rumours suggesting he may have fled to one of the Sahelian states.
‘If he is in an AES capital, he is safe; there’s no risk of him being handed over to Benin,’ said Seidik Abba, director of the International Centre for Studies and Reflections on the Sahel.
Abba and other analysts stress, however, that speculation should not be mistaken for proof. ‘At this stage, there is no material evidence showing that a Sahelian country transferred money or equipment to the putschists,’ he said.
Strategic stakes for the AES
Since taking power in Niger two years ago, General Tiani has accused Benin of hosting French military bases designed to destabilise his regime. Both Benin and France deny the claim, but the Niger–Benin border has remained closed, cutting off a vital trade corridor.
‘If the coup had succeeded, it’s certain it would have been good news for the AES,’ Abba said. ‘A change of regime would have initiated the beginning of normalisation with Benin.’
Vidjingninou argued that the episode reflects a broader strategy seen in parts of Africa, where influence is exerted indirectly. ‘The subtlety of the method is key,’ he said. ‘Moscow does the same in sub-Saharan Africa: shaping environments rather than issuing direct orders.’
The AES leaders have made sovereignty their rallying cry, exiting ECOWAS and turning away from France while strengthening ties with Russia. Yet their lack of direct sea access continues to constrain trade and exports, including uranium from Niger, one of the world’s leading producers.
ECOWAS draws a line
Unlike the coups that brought down civilian governments in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, the attempted overthrow in Benin failed to mobilise public support. No crowds rallied behind the mutineers, and several hundred people later gathered to condemn the plot.
‘The fear was that the attempt would resonate within the Beninese army and the population; that didn’t happen,’ a Western military source said.
The Republican Guard stayed loyal to President Talon, repelling an assault on his residence and gradually restoring control. Benin was also supported by military action from neighbouring Nigeria under the auspices of ECOWAS, alongside intervention by French special forces.
Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s response marked a contrast with ECOWAS’s hesitation during Niger’s 2023 coup. This time, Tinubu ‘seized a golden opportunity to underscore Nigeria’s opposition to military coups and reassert its regional leadership’, said Nnamdi Obasi of the International Crisis Group.
A calculated risk
For the AES, analysts say, the failed coup still offered strategic insight. ‘If the coup succeeds, the AES gains a coastal ally,’ Obasi said. ‘If it fails, it pays no price, while having tested the opponent’s defences and identified their weaknesses.’
For Benin, the episode has reinforced its standing as a frontline state against regional instability. For the Sahel’s military rulers, it has underscored both the appeal and the limits of exporting their model beyond the desert.
