Keypoints
- Sudan’s backlash reflects deeper sovereignty tensions with Western diplomacy
- Parallel peace efforts risk fragmenting conflict resolution in Sudan
- Crisis exposes broader faultlines in Africa’s international engagement
SUDAN’S rejection of a Berlin conference on its war is not just a diplomatic dispute — it exposes a widening clash between Western conflict strategy and African assertions of sovereignty.
The backlash, articulated in a statement by Sudan’s Foreign Ministry this week, reflects a deeper frustration in Khartoum with what it sees as external efforts to shape outcomes without recognising state authority. By describing the conference as a ‘colonial tutelage approach’, Sudan is signalling that the dispute goes beyond process — it is about power, legitimacy and control over the path to peace.
The Berlin meeting, which brought together international partners and Sudanese civilian actors while excluding formal government participation, has become a flashpoint for this broader contest.
Why Sudan was excluded
To understand Sudan’s reaction, it is necessary to examine why Western governments and partners might convene discussions without Khartoum at the table.
Since the outbreak of war in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan’s political landscape has fractured, with competing centres of power and limited national cohesion. As Sudanese officials have argued in recent statements, the government views itself as the sole legitimate authority — a position that clashes with how external actors assess the conflict.
For international partners, engaging only the government risks reinforcing one side in a civil war. At the same time, engaging the RSF directly presents reputational challenges due to allegations of serious human rights abuses.
The result is a third approach: convening civilian groups and political actors in parallel forums designed to sustain dialogue and keep humanitarian coordination moving. Yet, as seen in recent resistance to foreign-led peacekeeping proposals, Sudan’s leadership views such initiatives not as neutral, but as intrusive.
The West’s parallel diplomacy strategy
The Berlin conference reflects a broader Western strategy that has evolved in response to increasingly complex conflicts: when state institutions are weakened or contested, diplomacy expands beyond governments.
This ‘multi-track diplomacy’ seeks to:
- Broaden participation beyond military elites
- Incorporate civil society perspectives
- Maintain humanitarian access
- Prevent diplomatic paralysis during active conflict
Analysts say such parallel diplomatic tracks have historically struggled to produce durable settlements in fragmented conflicts, particularly where competing authorities claim legitimacy.
Sudan’s response illustrates this tension clearly. By framing the conference as ‘colonial’, Khartoum is challenging not only the meeting itself but the underlying assumption that external actors can convene political processes without state consent. This argument aligns with a broader narrative in Sudanese political discourse, including positions outlined in criticism of colonial-era influence on African conflicts and reinforced in Africa Briefing’s reporting on Sudan’s rejection of the Berlin conference, where foreign involvement is portrayed as an extension of historical patterns of control.
RSF, legitimacy and narrative battles
At the centre of the dispute lies a contest over legitimacy and narrative.
For Khartoum, any process that appears to place the RSF on equal footing with the national army is unacceptable. Officials have repeatedly framed the RSF as a ‘criminal militia’, while international actors often adopt more neutral language to preserve engagement channels.
This divergence is not merely rhetorical. It shapes how negotiations are structured, how aid is delivered, and how the conflict is understood globally.
By rejecting the Berlin conference, Sudan is asserting a singular narrative: that the state, represented by the army, remains the legitimate authority. However, the reality on the ground complicates this claim. The RSF controls significant territory and resources, making it an unavoidable actor in any future settlement.
This creates a persistent dilemma for international diplomacy: excluding the RSF risks irrelevance, while including it risks conferring legitimacy.
Africa’s sovereignty dilemma revisited
Sudan’s stance reflects a wider continental tension over sovereignty and external intervention.
Across Africa, governments have increasingly pushed back against foreign-led initiatives perceived as overreaching. Similar tensions have emerged in past interventions in Libya and the Sahel, where externally driven processes struggled to secure lasting stability.
Efforts such as those discussed at African Union forums on conflict resolution highlight attempts to strengthen African-led responses. However, these frameworks often face constraints in funding, coordination and political alignment.
At its core, this reflects a broader insistence that conflict resolution mechanisms should prioritise state consent and regional leadership.
Yet this position raises difficult questions. When governments are themselves fragmented or directly involved in the conflict, can sovereignty alone provide a viable foundation for peace?
Parallel diplomacy risks prolonging Sudan war
The growing number of parallel initiatives — Western-led conferences, regional mediation efforts and bilateral engagements — risks creating a fragmented diplomatic environment.
In Sudan, this fragmentation has already limited progress. Multiple ceasefire attempts have failed, and competing proposals have struggled to gain traction among key actors.
Analysts warn that without greater coordination, overlapping diplomatic tracks risk entrenching the conflict by reducing pressure on key actors to compromise.
The Berlin conference crystallises this dilemma. While aimed at mobilising humanitarian support and sustaining dialogue, its exclusion of key actors risks undermining its relevance to those controlling events on the ground.
At the same time, fully inclusive processes carry their own risks, particularly when they involve groups accused of serious violations.
What happens next
The immediate consequence of Sudan’s rejection is likely to be increased diplomatic friction rather than disengagement. Western governments remain invested in preventing further deterioration, particularly given the conflict’s implications for regional stability.
The Red Sea corridor, refugee flows and cross-border security risks all elevate Sudan’s crisis beyond a domestic issue, drawing sustained international attention.
Going forward, three scenarios are emerging. First, external actors may continue parallel engagement strategies, deepening tensions with Khartoum but maintaining humanitarian access. Second, pressure may grow for a more unified framework that includes both the government and its rivals, though this remains politically difficult. Third, diplomatic fragmentation could persist, prolonging the conflict and delaying any meaningful settlement.
For Sudan’s leadership, the priority will be to reassert control over the political narrative and ensure that any future negotiations recognise its authority.
For international actors, the challenge will be to balance inclusivity with legitimacy, while avoiding the perception of imposed solutions.
Ultimately, Sudan’s backlash highlights a defining reality of modern conflict resolution: diplomacy is no longer a neutral space. Decisions about participation, representation and leadership are themselves political acts, shaping outcomes as much as the negotiations they enable.
As the war continues, diplomacy risks becoming another contested arena — one where competing visions of sovereignty, legitimacy and power collide with no easy resolution.
In Sudan, the battle is no longer only on the ground — it is also over who gets to define the terms of peace.
