THE recent coup in Niger presents the United States with a familiar dilemma in how it conducts security cooperation assistance. The US can take a principled stand in defence of constitutional democracy—and in defence of the notion that democracy is important for long-term security and stability—or pragmatically choose to hold its nose and work with putschists in Niamey. There is no easy solution, but current dynamics in the Sahel, which indicate that without outside help al-Qaida and Islamic State-affiliated groups will rapidly gain strength in the region, call for US policymakers to pursue the latter, pragmatic course, write Michael Shurkin and Colin P. Clarke.
Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, or JNIM, Islamic State Sahel Province, or ISSP, and Islamic State West Africa Province, or ISWAP, are among the most operationally capable groups active on the continent. JNIM now controls much of Mali and approximately 40 percent of Burkina Faso, according to estimates by the US government, and ISSP has been growing from strength to strength in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Attacks throughout the region have surged. Data analysed by the Global Terrorism Index shows that the Sahel accounted for 43 percent of terrorism deaths globally in 2022, compared to just 1 percent of total deaths in 2007. France’s departure from Mali last year gave a boost especially to the Islamic State group, and its likely departure from Niger will have a similar effect there.
In addition, the possibility that Russia is ready to fill a US and French power vacuum by deploying Wagner Group mercenaries further argues for US engagement in the region. Wagner is now active in an emerging corridor of coups, including in Sudan, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Niger may soon be next. Because Wagner’s assistance is purely transactional, without conditions related to human rights, it is an easy choice for the Sahel’s juntas. Wagner’s forces also appeal to junta leaders because they can use the mercenaries as their Praetorian Guard, while ostensibly working to combat jihadist groups operating throughout the region. Russia has prepared the ground for Wagner in the region with disinformation campaigns that stoke anti-Western, especially anti-French, sentiment. Few expect the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin to result in any disruptions to Wagner’s African operations.
But US concerns about Russian influence should remain subordinate to other policy concerns in the Sahel, including the prospect of state collapse and the expansion of jihadist insurgencies. The horrific violence currently afflicting the three core states of the Sahel—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—is already threatening neighbouring countries. These include Benin, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal. The worse the situation becomes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the worse things become for those other countries, and the more difficult it will be to affect lasting solutions.
If the regimes who came to power via coups in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali have Russian mercenaries as their only option, the situation in the region will only get worse, as recent history in Burkina Faso and Mali demonstrates. The blueprint for fighting insurgencies in those countries has been to ratchet up state violence. Often, this means targeting ethnic Fulani communities with the assistance of the Wagner group. The Russian mercenary group has had no qualms about helping state security forces target civilians, and in Mali the very presence of Wagner mercenaries on joint patrols appears to encourage Malian troops to terrorise civilians. Strategically, the results are counterproductive. These scorched earth tactics generate grievances, which in turn help terrorists and insurgents recruit, fundraise, and gather intelligence.
Western-led security cooperation efforts in the Sahel should also consider the emerging reality that a large segment of the population in all the Sahelian countries is now deeply sceptical about the democratic pretences of the area’s civilian governments and is scornful even of the idea of democratic government. Many Burkinabè, Malians, and Nigeriens believe the juntas now ruling their countries are more politically legitimate and representative than the constitutional regimes they replaced. The former civilian governments’ association with France, which has become radioactive in the imaginations of many, is a significant problem. French motives are second-guessed and doubted. This resistance to French assistance provides an opening for the United States, which inspires less hostility.
While the US does not trigger the same kind of acerbic reactions as France, many Sahelians nonetheless perceive American concern for democracy as a bid to impose and maintain foreign influence. For many of the people who live in these countries, putsches are expressions of popular will and democracy is contrary to it. It is very difficult to know how widespread such sentiments are, but there are indications a significant portion and possibly a majority in the region may hold such views. The fact that US defence of democracy means so little in the region suggests principled stands can achieve little at the moment. Given this reality, working with the new juntas rather than trying to starve them through sanctions would be likely to garner public support in the Sahel.
When necessary, US guidelines on security cooperation have proven flexible. The case of Egypt is instructive. When Abdel Fatah el-Sisi took power in a coup there in 2013, the US went about business as usual, because Cairo was considered a strategic partner that Washington could not afford to abandon. This sort of flexibility should especially be employed in the Sahel, where porous borders, corruption, weak rule of law, under-resourced state security forces, and challenges like climate change, food insecurity, and migration make the situation particularly dire and dangerous.
There are no attractive options for the West in dealing with the Sahel. If the US does decide to work with undemocratic governments in the region, it will be imperative to employ available levers to encourage partner nations to be better. Admittedly, the United States’ track record in this regard is poor. But by refusing to engage at all, the US will guarantee that the problem of jihadist violence in the Sahel only gets worse.
Michael Shurkin is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Colin P. Clarke is the director of research at the Soufan Group.
This article if republished from the World Politics Review (WPR)
