Keypoints:
- Public opinion drives Kenya’s China tilt
- Chinese projects challenge Western aid models
- Calls for stronger foreign policy framework
IN recent years, Kenya’s international alignments have drawn global attention, particularly as China deepens its presence across Africa. A new CGTN Africa poll reveals that a majority of Kenyans now prefer China to the US as a development partner. This represents a deeper shift in how foreign policy is being shaped, not only from the top down by diplomats, but also increasingly from the bottom up, by public sentiment and lived experience.
The Standard Gauge Railway as a symbol
At the heart of this shift lies the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), a $3.6bn project financed largely through Chinese loans. The SGR is emblematic of China’s infrastructural statecraft, a model that prioritises visible, tangible development over the conditions-based aid associated with Western donors. This has significant resonance with modernisation theory, which posits that development follows a linear path from traditional to modern societies, catalysed by investments in infrastructure, industry and technology. For many Kenyans, the SGR is a symbol of modernity and transformation.
Beyond modernisation theory
But modernisation theory does not fully explain why China’s influence has gained such deep traction. What we are witnessing may be better understood through developmental pragmatism and foreign policy realism. China’s approach—non-interference in domestic politics, speed of delivery and large-scale financing—offers a more flexible alternative to bureaucratic conditionalities. This resonates with African governments seeking rapid development while maintaining sovereignty.
Foreign policy gaps
However, this shift raises questions about Kenya’s foreign policy architecture. As I argued in my Business Daily article titled Diplomatic Gaffes Expose Kenya’s Foreign Policy Soft Underbelly, Kenya’s foreign policy often appears reactionary, lacking a clear strategic framework. Traditional models of foreign policy decision-making—the rational actor model, the bureaucratic politics model and the organisational process model—assume a level of coherence and institutionalisation that may not apply uniformly in the Kenyan context.
Competing models of decision-making
The rational actor model, for instance, assumes a unified state making calculated decisions to maximise national interest. Yet Kenya’s foreign relations often reflect fragmented priorities, shaped by shifting political coalitions, donor pressures and ad hoc diplomacy. The bureaucratic politics model may offer more explanatory power, as Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs competes with other agencies, like the Treasury, State House or even counties, for influence on international decisions. This diffusion of authority can result in contradictory actions, such as courting both China and the West while mismanaging debt or transparency obligations.
The organisational process model, which sees policy as the result of standard operating procedures, may explain the inertia in how Kenya engages multilaterally, but it does not capture the dynamic political shifts that have occurred with the pivot toward China.
Foreign policy from below
What these models often overlook is the role of public opinion and perception—what could be termed foreign policy from below. The CGTN poll provides compelling evidence that ordinary Kenyans are not passive recipients of international alignments. Rather, their lived experiences, such as commuting on the SGR, benefiting from Chinese-built roads or hospitals, or witnessing delayed Western-backed projects, shape their preferences and, in turn, create political pressure for alignment.
This concept of foreign policy from below challenges the elite-centric narratives of diplomacy. It suggests that legitimacy in foreign partnerships is increasingly dependent on tangible local benefits. In this view, China’s success in Kenya is not merely due to strategic diplomacy, but also to its ability to ‘deliver’ in ways that are visible to the public. As citizens equate foreign partners with outcomes, diplomatic legitimacy is being democratised, albeit informally.
Risks of a populist tilt
Yet this bottom-up shift also carries risks. Populist preferences can be volatile and influenced by short-term gains over long-term sustainability. For instance, while many Kenyans appreciate China’s infrastructure investment, there is growing concern over debt, maintenance costs and transparency. Without a strong, institutionalised foreign policy strategy, Kenya risks making choices based on immediate perception rather than strategic balance.
Aligning bottom-up and top-down strategies
Kenya stands at a complex foreign policy crossroads. The preference for China reflects a broader reimagining of development and sovereignty. Traditional models of foreign policy need to be expanded to account for public perception and grassroots legitimacy. At the same time, Kenya’s foreign policy apparatus must evolve to align bottom-up expectations with top-down strategic planning, ensuring that short-term infrastructural gains translate into long-term national development.
Yet while initiatives like Foreign Policy Mashinani aim to decentralise diplomacy, they risk becoming tokenistic if not supported by genuine structural reforms and local capacity. Without clear mechanisms for grassroots input to influence actual decision-making, the idea of foreign policy from below may remain more rhetorical than real.
Mikhail Nyamweya is a foreign policy analyst and holds an Msc in African Studies from the University of Oxford
