Keypoints:
- Government invokes constitutional authority
- Reform committee recommends abolishing tribunals
- Critics fear politicised and duplicated justice
GHANA’S decision to revive regional and district tribunals has become a test of whether faster justice can be delivered without weakening public confidence in the courts.
Parliament passed the Tribunals Bill, 2026, on July 16 after heated debate and a failed Minority attempt to remove the clause establishing the proposed bodies. The bill still requires President John Dramani Mahama’s assent. Supporters say specialised tribunals will reduce delays and strengthen criminal enforcement. Critics fear duplicated courts, politicised appointments and institutions burdened by Ghana’s authoritarian past.
The central dispute is not whether tribunals appear in the Constitution. They do. The harder question is whether activating them is a coherent use of limited judicial resources when the government’s own constitutional review recommends their abolition.
Constitutional authority, policy contradiction
Attorney-General Dominic Ayine has built the government’s case around Articles 126 and 142 of the 1992 Constitution. Article 126 places Regional Tribunals within Ghana’s integrated judicial system and allows Parliament to establish lower courts or tribunals by law. Article 142 specifically provides for Regional Tribunals.
Ayine therefore rejects the claim that the bill creates a rival judiciary. ‘We are not creating a parallel justice system. We are simply amplifying what is provided for in the Constitution,’ he told Parliament.
That is a credible legal argument. Parliament is not inventing an institution prohibited by Ghana’s supreme law.
Legal authority, however, does not settle the policy argument. The Constitution Review Committee appointed by Mahama recommended that Regional Tribunals be removed from the Constitution. It concluded that the High Court had absorbed their caseload and that resources needed to revive the tribunals would be better directed to the High, Circuit and District courts.
This places the government on competing tracks. It is seeking to activate tribunals under the present Constitution while considering reforms that could eliminate them from a future constitutional order. Public resources could be committed to institutions that a later constitutional amendment may abolish.
The contradiction does not make the bill unlawful, but it raises a sequencing question: why establish the tribunals before the government publishes a response to the committee and explains why it rejects that recommendation?
Backlogs strengthen government’s case
Ghana’s justice system faces a delay problem. The Attorney-General told Parliament that conventional courts accumulate about 3,360 backlog cases every year, strengthening his argument for reform. Prolonged proceedings can punish accused people before guilt is established, exhaust witnesses, increase costs and undermine confidence in prosecution.
Ayine argues that specialised tribunals will take defined criminal matters out of overcrowded court lists. Their jurisdiction would include offences involving illegal mining, narcotics, taxation, customs, economic fraud and financial loss to the state.
Specialisation could produce benefits. Adjudicators repeatedly handling complex mining, customs or economic cases may develop useful expertise.
Yet a new institutional label does not create capacity. Tribunals require qualified chairpersons, trained panel members, registrars, courtrooms, prosecutors, secure records and sustained funding. Without those foundations, Ghana could move delayed cases from one queue to another rather than reduce the backlog.
The relevant comparison is not tribunals versus inertia. It is tribunals versus properly resourced existing courts, including specialised divisions operating inside the familiar judicial hierarchy. Government must show why the first option will deliver better results.
Opposition warns of parallel justice
Minority Leader Alexander Afenyo-Markin sought to delete Clause 4, which establishes regional and district tribunals. His proposal was defeated by 135 votes to 16 before the Minority walked out.
‘I contend that creating this new tribunal system by this provision will bring chaos to the justice delivery system we have in our country,’ he said. ‘This is populism. We need clarity.’
His concern goes beyond duplication. Tribunal panels would include a legally qualified chairperson alongside members who may not be lawyers. Lay participation is not inherently incompatible with justice; juries and assessors allow citizens to contribute to adjudication in many systems.
The bill must nevertheless define which questions belong to the legally qualified chairperson, how disagreements are resolved and how reasons are recorded. Criminal liability can turn on technical rules governing evidence, intent and statutory interpretation. Unclear roles could generate more appeals, undermining the promised efficiency.
The Trades Union Congress has added a broader political objection. Deputy General Secretary Kwabena Nyarko Otoo said: ‘We are concerned about the potential for politicisation of the judiciary system.’
The TUC questions proposed appointment arrangements and argues that the constitutional review should be completed before tribunals are restored. It says existing courts should be strengthened rather than supplemented by a structure carrying difficult historical associations.
Safeguards confront historical memory
Government supporters insist the proposed tribunals differ fundamentally from the public tribunals associated with military rule. The new bodies would operate within the Judiciary, apply recognised criminal procedure and remain subject to appellate supervision. A Tribunal Oversight Committee under the Judicial Council would monitor their work.
Effective appeals can prevent tribunals from becoming instruments of executive convenience.
But institutional memory cannot be removed by statutory language. For many Ghanaians, the term ‘tribunal’ recalls politically charged prosecutions and weak due-process protections. The government therefore carries a heavier burden than it would when establishing an ordinary specialised court.
Appointments should be transparent and based on published criteria. Case allocation must be protected from political direction. Judgments should be publicly accessible, while annual reports should disclose filings, completion times, adjournments, appeals, reversals and misconduct complaints.
These safeguards would allow citizens to test the government’s promise of faster justice against measurable outcomes. Without transparent data, efficiency will remain an assertion rather than an established benefit.
Galamsey raises the stakes
Illegal mining, locally known as galamsey, helps explain the government’s urgency. Galamsey has damaged rivers, forests and cocoa-producing areas, while repeated arrests have not persuaded the public that politically connected operators are consistently punished.
Specialised tribunals could concentrate expertise and keep mining prosecutions moving. But politically popular cases are precisely where due process matters most. Such prosecutions can involve disputed licences, land rights, corporate ownership, environmental evidence and allegations of official protection.
Speed should therefore be measured by sound decisions, not rapid convictions. A judgment overturned because the defence lacked preparation time or the panel misunderstood the law would neither save resources nor strengthen public trust.
The political context also matters. The governing National Democratic Congress (NDC) holds a parliamentary super-majority, giving it the votes to advance contested legislation. That power increases its responsibility to build confidence beyond its caucus.
A tribunal system established over opposition and labour objections could face an immediate legitimacy problem when it tries an opposition politician, a politically connected businessperson or a defendant in a sensitive corruption case.
Mahama’s decision
Mahama must decide whether the bill’s safeguards answer these concerns or whether reconsideration is needed. A defensible implementation plan would require the government to explain the contradiction with the Constitution Review Committee, justify the financial case for tribunals and publish safeguards before hearings begin.
The bill may be constitutionally permissible and still prove institutionally unwise. Conversely, tribunals could become useful if appointments are independent, procedures are precise, appeals are meaningful and performance is publicly measured.
Ghana will not settle the argument through parliamentary assurances. The real verdict will come from the first appointments, the first politically sensitive prosecution and the first moment when a tribunal must choose due process over public or governmental impatience.
