Op-Ed: Berbera – the port that tempts Washington

Keypoints:

• Somaliland offers U.S. military access
• Berbera port rivals Chinese stronghold in Djibouti
• Minerals and geography reshape recognition debate

SOMALILAND is increasingly using its geography as a geopolitical asset. Since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, the territory has remained unrecognised internationally. Yet today, Somaliland is mounting a bold campaign to secure US recognition — by offering both military access to its strategic port at Berbera and a gateway to critical mineral reserves.

This outreach comes as global attention intensifies around Red Sea security, supply chain resilience, and US–China rivalry. For Washington, the moment presents a pressing question: should it rethink its long-held ‘One Somalia’ policy to engage with a more stable but unrecognised partner?

Order and unrest in a fragile neighbourhood

Somaliland presents itself as a stable counterpoint to Somalia’s federal government, which continues to battle Islamist insurgents and institutional fragility. Somaliland runs its own elections, prints its own currency, and operates its own security forces. The African Development Bank has praised its fiscal management as among the strongest in the Horn of Africa.

But this narrative of order is not without blemish. The ongoing conflict in Las Anod and the SSC–Khatumo uprising have exposed deep clan divisions and raised questions about Somaliland’s capacity for inclusive governance. These tensions complicate the case for recognition, suggesting it could amplify domestic instability.

Critical minerals: a new bargaining chip

Somaliland’s most compelling case lies beneath its soil. Preliminary geological surveys point to deposits of lithium, tin, gypsum, and industrial gemstones. While extraction is still in its infancy, the US Geological Survey suggests the broader Horn of Africa could meet up to 3–5 percent of global demand for these minerals — a strategic opportunity as the US moves to de-risk supply chains from China under the Defense Production Act’s 2022 amendment on critical minerals.

By the numbers: Berbera and Bab el‑Mandeb

• 6.2 million barrels/day of oil transited Bab el‑Mandeb in 2021 (U.S. EIA)
• 30 percent of global container trade moves through the Red Sea–Suez corridor annually (UNCTAD 2022)
• 12 percent of global trade by volume crosses the Bab el‑Mandeb–Suez route (ICS 2021)
• 500,000 TEUs: current Berbera port capacity (target: 2 million TEUs by 2035)
• $500 million/year in livestock exports pre‑COVID (AfDB 2020)
• 260 km: Berbera’s distance from Bab el‑Mandeb Strait

A strategic node on Washington’s radar

Berbera port is Somaliland’s trump card. Located just 260 km east of the Bab el‑Mandeb Strait, it provides potential redundancy to Djibouti, where congestion and a growing Chinese military presence raise red flags in Washington.

According to the Naval War College Review, Berbera could serve as a viable alternative for US and allied deployments in the Red Sea corridor. As Houthi attacks and al‑Shabaab insurgency continue to threaten maritime stability, Berbera’s value as a counterterrorism and logistics hub is growing.

Growing bipartisan interest in the US

Despite official adherence to Somalia’s territorial integrity, some US policymakers are reassessing the cost of inaction. Former UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson and US Congressman John Moolenaar have advocated deeper engagement with Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital.

Bipartisan hearings in the US Congress have floated the idea of opening a liaison office — a symbolic step that would stop short of recognition, yet signal serious intent.

China, Djibouti, and Somaliland’s pitch

China’s deep infrastructure footprint, particularly in Djibouti, reinforces Somaliland’s narrative of offering the West a less encumbered alternative. While Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative offers billions in financing, Hargeisa counters with the promise of an ‘equitable partnership’: military access, minerals, and governance collaboration without debt dependency.

However, African Union norms against recognising secessionist states remain a formidable obstacle. Major capitals — including Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Cairo — are wary of setting a precedent that might embolden separatist movements elsewhere.

Risks of recognition and disengagement

Recognition is not a silver bullet. The Las Anod conflict threatens Somaliland’s internal coherence, while full U.S. endorsement risks rupturing ties with Mogadishu and undermining AU-led counterterrorism efforts.

A dual-track strategy — balancing engagement with both Mogadishu and Hargeisa — may offer the most pragmatic path forward.

Policy options for Washington

Agnes Gitau is Managing Partner at GBS Africa and Executive Director of the Eastern Africa Association. She is a leading advisor on trade, governance, and investment in East Africa and writes regularly on how geopolitics is reshaping development across the continent