African states hire Trump-linked lobbyists

Keypoints:

Nigeria signed a deal worth up to $9m
DR Congo and Tanzania also hired lobbyists
Private advisers are filling diplomatic gaps

AFRICAN governments are increasingly hiring Trump-linked lobbyists to secure access to President Donald Trump’s administration, manage diplomatic crises and advance security or investment interests that conventional channels have struggled to deliver.

The trend raises questions beyond the legality of lobbying. It exposes weaknesses in African diplomatic institutions, uncertainty over how public money is authorised and the danger that governments may spend heavily on managing their reputations abroad while leaving underlying problems unresolved at home.

Why Trump’s Washington rewards access

Trump’s foreign policy is highly personalised. Governments unable to attract the president’s attention through formal channels may find that relationships with former campaign officials, political allies or influential supporters provide a faster route into policy discussions.

An investigation by the Financial Times found that African governments had spent millions of dollars on Republican-linked lobbying firms believed to have access to Trump and senior figures around him.

Nigeria is the clearest example, but DR Congo and Tanzania have also retained Washington firms while pursuing military cooperation, strategic investment and relief from political pressure.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act generally requires people and firms carrying out political or public-relations work in the United States for foreign principals to register and disclose their activities, subject to statutory exemptions. These engagements were publicly disclosed, but African citizens may not receive comparable transparency from the governments paying the bills.

What Nigeria’s contract buys

Nigeria retained DCI Group through Abuja-based Aster Legal in December 2025.

The agreement filed with the US Justice Department provided for a payment of $4.5m covering an initial six months. It could be extended for another six months at the same cost, taking its potential value to $9m.

DCI was engaged to communicate Nigeria’s efforts to protect Christian communities and maintain American support for its campaign against jihadist organisations and other security threats.

The contract followed Trump’s accusation that Nigeria was failing to protect Christians and his threat of military intervention.

Africa Briefing previously reported that Abuja hired the US firm as pressure increased in Washington over claims that Christians were facing organised persecution.

Nigeria rejects the portrayal of its insecurity as a straightforward religious conflict, arguing that insurgency, banditry, farmer-herder clashes, kidnapping and organised crime affect Christian and Muslim communities. The apparent purpose of the campaign was to present that more complex account to an administration influenced by evangelical concerns.

Relations shift after lobbying push

On December 25, 2025, US Africa Command carried out strikes against Islamic State targets in Nigeria’s Sokoto State in coordination with Nigerian authorities.

At the National Prayer Breakfast in Washington on February 5, 2026, Trump called Nigeria’s First Lady, Remi Tinubu, ‘a very respected person’ and said the two governments were working in ‘close co-operation’ against Islamist terrorism.

The White House published footage of the event, while the FT reported that DCI had helped arrange meetings between Tinubu, a pastor, and influential members of Trump’s evangelical political constituency.

Foreign-agent filings also listed long-time Trump associate Roger Stone among consultants working on the Nigerian account.

The public warmth marked a sharp change from Trump’s earlier hostile language. It does not prove that lobbying alone caused the shift, because Washington also wants to contain Islamic State networks in West Africa. Yet the timing explains why African governments may view politically connected lobbyists as more effective than slower diplomatic channels.

In May, Nigeria’s Defence Headquarters said Nigerian and US forces conducted a coordinated operation that killed Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, described as a senior Islamic State commander.

The operation reflected broader US–Nigeria counter-terrorism cooperation, including intelligence sharing, training and operational support.

The cost of bypassing embassies

The Nigerian case also reveals an institutional weakness.

Nearly three years after President Bola Tinubu took office, Nigeria still had no ambassador posted to Washington when the relationship entered one of its most difficult periods, according to the FT.

Private advisers were therefore performing some of the political outreach and message management normally expected of a fully functioning diplomatic mission.

Specialist lobbyists can complement an embassy, but private firms do not hold a public mandate and their access can disappear when political personnel change. Embassies preserve institutional memory and represent national interests beyond one government’s immediate priorities.

Nigeria’s decision therefore raises a central question: was the contract an exceptional response to a crisis, or an expensive solution made necessary by diplomatic neglect?

DR Congo seeks strategic leverage

DR Congo has also used Washington lobbyists while seeking greater US involvement in its security crisis and mineral sector.

A January 2025 foreign-agent filing shows that Kinshasa agreed to pay Ballard Partners $100,000 a month for strategic advocacy services.

The FT reported that the contract was subsequently terminated, although DR Congo has retained other firms.

Kinshasa wants US pressure applied to Rwanda over the conflict in eastern DR Congo, while Washington is seeking reliable access to copper, cobalt and other minerals used in defence, energy and technology supply chains.

The Congolese government has rejected claims that its minerals partnership with Washington amounts to surrendering control of strategic resources.

Political access could help President Félix Tshisekedi attract investment, reduce dependence on China and present DR Congo as an essential Western partner. It could also weaken scrutiny if short-term support is traded for opaque long-term commitments.

Tanzania seeks Washington reset

Tanzania hired BGR Government Affairs through Drift Advisors in June 2026.

A US Justice Department filing states that BGR was retained for $250,000 a month over 12 months, producing a total value of $3m.

BGR managing director David Urban helped lead Trump’s 2016 campaign in Pennsylvania, giving the firm strong links to the president’s political network.

The contract followed Tanzania’s disputed October 2025 election and criticism of the violence surrounding it.

A government-appointed inquiry reported that approximately 518 people died in the unrest. It largely blamed protesters for the violence, a conclusion rejected by opposition groups, while recommending further investigation into the use of firearms.

Washington had already begun reassessing relations with Tanzania over political repression, human-rights concerns and risks to investment.

Tanzania also needs foreign capital for gas, minerals and infrastructure. Its campaign is therefore likely to prevent governance concerns from obstructing commercial and strategic engagement.

Where lobbying ends and governance begins

The strongest argument against these contracts is not that governments should never employ outside advisers.

Specialist representation can help African states explain poorly understood security challenges. The concern is whether public relations becomes a substitute for reform.

Nigeria can challenge an oversimplified religious-persecution narrative while remaining accountable for its failure to protect citizens.

DR Congo can seek US support while remaining transparent about minerals and security agreements. Tanzania can engage Washington while answering questions about election violence and democratic accountability.

Lobbyists may secure meetings and improve messaging. They cannot solve insecurity, restore public trust or build legitimate institutions.

What happens next?

African governments are likely to continue hiring politically connected firms while personal access remains central to Trump’s foreign relations.

Taxpayer-funded contracts should face parliamentary scrutiny, clear procurement rules and public reporting on who authorised the expenditure, which budget funded it and how success will be measured.

Governments must also rebuild the embassies and diplomatic services that provide continuity when lobbying contracts expire.

The lesson from Nigeria is not that $9m automatically buys favourable policy. It is that a weakened diplomatic system can make an expensive private alternative appear indispensable.

Lobbying can support national diplomacy. It should never become a permanent replacement for it.